Treffer: The Multidimensional Epistemology of Computer Simulations: Novel Issues and the Need to Avoid the Drunkard’s Search Fallacy

Title:
The Multidimensional Epistemology of Computer Simulations: Novel Issues and the Need to Avoid the Drunkard’s Search Fallacy
Authors:
Contributors:
Archives Henri-Poincaré - Philosophie et Recherches sur les Sciences et les Technologies (AHP-PReST), Université de Strasbourg (UNISTRA)-Université de Lorraine (UL)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Claus Beisbart, Nicole J. Saam, IMPACT-OLKi, ANR-15-IDEX-0004,LUE,Isite LUE(2015)
Source:
Computer Simulation Validation: Fundamental Concepts, Methodological Frameworks, and Philosophical Perspectives ; https://hal.science/hal-03036456 ; Claus Beisbart; Nicole J. Saam. Computer Simulation Validation: Fundamental Concepts, Methodological Frameworks, and Philosophical Perspectives, Springer, pp.1029-1055, 2019, Simulation Foundations, Methods and Applications, ⟨10.1007/978-3-319-70766-2_43⟩
Publisher Information:
CCSD
Springer
Publication Year:
2019
Document Type:
Buch book part
Language:
English
DOI:
10.1007/978-3-319-70766-2_43
Rights:
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Accession Number:
edsbas.21359EE7
Database:
BASE

Weitere Informationen

International audience ; Computers have transformed science and help to extend the boundaries of human knowledge. However, does the validation and diffusion of results of computational inquiries and computer simulations call for a novel epistemological analysis? I discuss how the notion of novelty should be cashed out to investigate this issue meaningfully and argue that a consequentialist framework similar to the one used by Goldman to develop social epistemology can be helpful at this point. I highlight computational, mathematical, representational, and social stages on which the validity of simulation-based belief-generating processes hinges, and emphasize that their epistemic impact depends on the scientific practices that scientists adopt at these different stages. I further argue that epistemologists cannot ignore these partially novel issues and conclude that the epistemology of computational inquiries needs to go beyond that of models and scientific representations and has cognitive, social, and in the present case computational, dimensions.